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Patrick O’Donovan 
 
Proust’s ‘grands chagrins utiles’: beyond contingency? 
 
 
 
At a certain point in Le Temps retrouvé, the Narrator appears to take a clear and insistent line 
when it comes to the issue of ‘le chagrin’. The impact of ‘le chagrin’, he says, is in the end 
biological: the pain it causes simply brings us closer to death; before the body comes to be 
destroyed, all we can do, for the sake of ‘la connaissance spirituelle’, is to extract whatever 
parcel of understanding we can from the experience (RTP, IV, 484-85). What seems to 
prompt the conviction that ‘la connaissance spirituelle’ is something of value is the new 
urgency which attaches to the Narrator’s projected work, in the light of the discoveries which 
he has just recorded. As the Narrator begins, then, to envisage his book as a realizable 
project, it seems possible to impose closure on certain of the threads which constitute the 
quest that has led him to this point, to aspire to the attainment of wisdom in the face of 
suffering. This gesture represents one view of what it might be to be beyond contingency. 
 This intriguing line of thought is eminently Proustian in that it forms part of the 
novel’s ceaseless plotting of the dynamics of loss and recovery. At the same time, it can be 
connected to a line of writing in fiction and indeed in thought which is centred on feeling that 
is no less singular, on which Proust himself draws. These two issues — the significance we 
might assign to the insights which shape the Narrator’s resolutions at the end of the novel, on 
the one hand, and the representation of affect in modern fictional narrative, on the other — 
are connected in the work of Richard Bales.1 What I shall comment on here is how, in 
Proust’s work, these two strands, though they appear to diverge, in fact provide a perspective 
within which we can engage with his representation of subjectivity. To elucidate this claim, I 
shall combine my discussion of the Recherche with some comments on Goethe’s Elective 
Affinities and Constant’s Adolphe, where the issue that dominates each narrative is, by 
contrast, the apparent futility of certain experiences of passion.  
It is indeed the case that Proust’s response to the suffering of sorrow can be situated 
with reference to the emergence within modern European culture of a discourse of affectivity 
                                            
1 See in particular Proust: ‘A la recherche du temps perdu’ (London: Grant and Cutler, 
1995), ch. 6, and Persuasion in the French Personal Novel: Studies of Chateaubriand, 
Constant, Balzac, Nerval, and Fromentin (Birmingham, AL: Summa, 1997). 
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centred ultimately on the issue of representation. What is significant about this discourse is 
that it parallels and indeed could be said to supplant a countervailing ethical theory 
essentially derived from Stoic and other ancient sources. Adam Smith trenchantly calls into 
question the Stoic insistence on the need to eliminate the passions and proceeds to present the 
imagination as a source of moral judgements. He takes a special case: the sometimes acute 
feelings of concern and care which a parent may feel for a child. However excessive such a 
feeling may appear, it is difficult to regard it as hateful. It is rather, Smith argues, the Stoic 
position — that any such feeling should be repressed — which is repellent. Smith generalizes 
this argument, saying that what is true of parental affection, or more generally of love and 
friendship, applies in fact also to the entire range of ‘private and domestic affections’.  He 
concludes his rebuttal of Stoicism with a provocative appeal to imaginary passions: 
The stoical apathy is, in such cases, never agreeable […] The poets and romance 
writers, who best paint the refinements and delicacies of love and friendship, and of 
all other private and domestic affections, Racine and Voltaire; Richardson, 
Maurivaux, and Riccoboni; are, in such cases, much better instructors than Zeno, 
Chrysippus, or Epictetus.2 
 
For Smith, the choice of modern authors consolidates the break with ancient philosophy. 
Indeed, there is something of a precautionary move here. Stoic philosophy illustrates what 
may be a vice of philosophy more generally: in its construction of a theory of human nature 
and human conduct, it can pre-empt any effort to understand how some feeling — even an 
extreme feeling — may in fact be reconciled with a sense of virtue and self-approbation, as 
Smith himself goes on to argue. Thus, sorrow at the misfortune of others or grief for the dead 
may seem perfectly justified and justifiable feelings. Two points are to be noted: first, drama 
and fiction are enduring sources of a scepticism towards the claims of philosophical systems 
which is salutary; and, second, these forms of writing further provide access to an 
emotionally conditioned perspective on the emotions. By excluding Stoic apathy, Smith seeks 
to define the proper place and character of feeling — in the very process of how we 
understand and deal with feeling.3  
Now, at first glance the Narrator’s attempted transmutation of ‘le chagrin’ into ‘la 
connaissance spirituelle’ seems to diverge from such a stance. Behind the question of 
                                            
2 The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 164–65. 
3 For a comparable contemporary intervention, see Richard Wollheim, who argues that when 
we fall under the sway of philosophy we are ‘seduced into abandoning the natural, which is 
the psychological, understanding of mental dispositions’ (On the Emotions (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 6, 33, 223). 
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wisdom, there seems to lurk something of an impasse: the attempt to confront painful feelings 
appears to be deflected into a project with a different, more cerebral, focus. The question to 
which I now turn is this: to what extent does extreme feeling equate with a certain exposure 
to contingency? It is possible that the Narrator’s gesture amounts to an attempted 
displacement, not just of the problem of feeling, but also that of contingency. Viewed in this 
light, the concern which the Narrator articulates may be a cryptic way of connecting the 
problem of affectivity with other problems: this is a possibility which I shall explore further. 
A claim we can derive from Smith is that representation is intimately connected to the 
resources on which we can draw as we grapple with the problems we experience with affect. 
The problem of affectivity is indeed that of its unmasterable dynamism and, within this 
component of mental life, it is the infant’s loss of a sense of her own or her parent’s 
omnipotence that signals the advent of contingency. So Adam Phillips argues, drawing on D. 
W. Winnicott. Painful experiences of emotional states confirm, all too tangibly, the outcome 
of the attainment of the Depressive Position, namely the loss of this sense of omnipotence 
and the ‘immense shock’ (to quote Winnicott) which it causes. In the face of ‘le chagrin’, 
then, all we can ever hope for is the most momentary equipoise. Even knowledge of 
contingency is ‘paradoxical’. Each parcel of understanding is precarious, as Phillips 
concludes, because ‘emotional experience is new at every moment’.4 Every insight, as a 
result, is contingent, because provisional, because vulnerable to the uncertainties, internal or 
external, subjective and social alike, which in turn it provokes. Desire, like knowledge, is 
shadowed by the contingencies that drive it on and in turn impinge on each and every one of 
its outcomes. The incompleteness of each is radical in that these outcomes re-enact a position 
where the subject is compelled — often painfully — to adopt an attitude of complete and 
uncertain openness to new emotional experiences.  
We can offer a provisional conclusion by saying that the narrative impact of Proust’s 
novel derives from a contingency that has many outcomes — affective, social, aesthetic — 
but whose significance could ultimately be said to lie in its perennial unforeseeable potential 
to precipitate shifts in how we think about the world and our place in it. The Narrator’s own 
position is ambiguous: from the outset, from the moment of the madeleine episode, he 
                                            
4 ‘Contingency for Beginners’, in On Flirtation (London: Faber, 1994), pp. 3–21 (pp. 19–21). 
The Depressive Position entails the recognition of the mother as a whole object, triggering 
anxieties connected with the possibility of loss. On the impact of the loss of the feeling of 
omnipotence, see D. W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 71. 
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acknowledges and seeks to espouse a positive contingency.5 But this pursuit co-exists with 
experiences of contingency which are — potentially — more ominous and which call the self 
and its projects into question. Yet at the end of the novel, the past recurs in a present laden 
with its own contingencies and it is here that the threat of death, which becomes more acute 
in the light of the revelations of the matinée of the Princesse de Guermantes, reveals the 
vicissitudes of temporality in a new light, such that one of its outcomes is to generate a whole 
series of new subjective pressures.6 
It is perhaps in this light that we should consider the Narrator’s attempts at 
containment when it comes to ‘le chagrin’. The Narrator elaborates the view that even pain 
can be a source of a certain joy, if we find some way of drawing on intelligence as a means of 
generalizing from our own experience: ‘Là où la vie emmure, l’intelligence perce une issue 
[…] on sort de la constatation d’une souffrance, ne fût-ce qu’en tirant les conséquences 
qu’elle comporte’ (RTP, IV, 484). On this basis, it is possible to embark on a taxonomy of the 
stages of suffering: what might have been only the beginnings of a moment of torment comes 
in fact to be fully actualized by the experience of some new desire and the suffering to which, 
in turn, it gives rise. And these sorrows then become the focus of an inverted loving gesture, 
almost a carpe diem:  
Pour ces grands chagrins utiles on ne peut pas trop se plaindre, car ils ne manquent 
pas, ils ne se font pas attendre bien longtemps. Tout de même il faut se dépêcher de 
profiter d’eux, car ils ne durent pas très longtemps: c’est qu’on se console, ou bien, 
quand ils sont trop forts, si le cœur n’est plus très solide, on meurt. (RTP, IV, 484) 
 
To avail of the utility of suffering, we must mobilize capacities which are above all 
intellectual. This attitude of mind finds its confirmation in what the Narrator presents as a 
negative psychological law: our capacity to benefit from pain (something which we must be 
prepared to do, because ‘c’est le chagrin qui développe les forces de l’esprit’) is constantly at 
risk from subjective factors: thus, ‘le chagrin’ is indispensable, because it is the means by 
which we can ‘nous remettre chaque fois dans la vérité’, and evade lapsing into the bad habits 
of passivity, of scepticism, of indifference. But this intellectual outcome has a precarious 
                                            
5 The experience of tasting the madeleine leads the Narrator to give a special prominence to a 
contingency which is at least half-benign: Il y a beaucoup de hasard en tout ceci, et un second 
hasard, celui de notre mort, souvent ne nous permet pas d’attendre longtemps les faveurs du 
premier’ (RTP, I, 43). 
6 I explore further Phillips’s model of contingency as applied to the Recherche and some of 
the ways in which it could be challenged, in ‘A Contradictory Look at the Look: Resisting Le 
Temps retrouvé’, in ‘Le Temps retrouvé’ Eighty Years After / 80 ans après: Critical Essays / 
Essais critiques, ed. by Adam Watt (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009), pp. 167–80. 
 5 
yield at best. Fully to embrace the harsh truths which suffering uncovers is fraught with 
mortal risks: ‘Il est vrai que cette vérité, qui n’est pas compatible avec le bonheur, avec la 
santé, ne l’est pas toujours avec la vie. Le chagrin finit par tuer’. If we must accept ‘le 
chagrin’, it is, as we saw at the outset, for the sake of ‘la connaissance spirituelle qu’il nous 
apporte’ (RTP, IV, 484–85). Because the body is mortal, it is the work that must become the 
repository of knowledge. 
So, in effect, the Narrator harnesses something of the sheer force of the novel’s 
redemptive outcome, itself the result of a series of contingencies with a special productive 
power, so as to bring some closure to what is a seminal thread in the novel. Perhaps to a 
greater degree than with any other affective state in the novel, ‘le chagrin’ is a salient issue 
from the outset and a slippery one: it is a state of feeling in which we are most powerfully 
exposed to the future and to all of the uncertainties with which it is freighted. This is the 
problem to which the Narrator finds he must respond. So he appears to conclude from the 
‘drame du coucher’, in which the affective interactions of child and parent are in fact equally 
opaque and unpredictable to all. The Narrator’s father intervenes unexpectedly to urge his 
wife to sleep in the same room as her son, he justifies doing so by referring to the pain he 
sees in the Narrator’s face: ‘tu vois bien que ce petit a du chagrin, il a l’air désolé, cet enfant’ 
(RTP, I, 36). But this intensely desired but altogether contingent outcome triggers new and 
unexpected feelings: his relationship with his mother is altered, in ways which themselves 
have the potential to cause future pain.7  
Ultimately, then, what emerges from the Narrator’s attempts to produce an account of 
‘le chagrin’ which will contain it is its intractability, in that any such effort is liable to be 
affected, precisely, by all of its own contingent outcomes and those of any number of other 
facets of mental life. In a sense, the attempt to resolve ‘le chagrin’ simply perpetuates it. The 
space and the prominence which the Narrator gives to the issue hints as much. There is an 
element of pessimism in the treatment of ‘le chagrin’ which points perhaps to unresolved 
subjective conflicts, exacerbated at the novel’s end by the looming contingencies of the 
present moment.  
The Narrator himself acknowledges explicitly that this is a way of thinking which 
presents him with some problems. Near the opening of La Prisonnière, as he ponders his 
                                            
7 The Narrator himself, drawing explicitly on experiences which date back to this period, 
concludes in an aside that intersubjectivity is inescapably subject to contingencies of this sort: 
‘il y a entre nous et les êtres un liséré de contingences, comme j’avais compris dans mes 
lectures de Combray qu’il y en a un de perception et qui empêche la mise en contact absolue 
de la réalité et de l’esprit’ (RTP, IV, 553). 
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reasons to be suspicious of Albertine, he notes half-ironically that the ways of thinking that 
come naturally to him are ill-adapted to contingency. He claims that how he thinks is a fact of 
nature: ‘le monde des possibles m’a toujours été plus ouvert que celui de la contingence 
réelle’. This passing acknowledgement of contingency quickly transforms into a statement of 
its forbidding scope, the catastrophes to which it exposes the subject: ‘Cela aide à connaître 
l’âme, mais on se laisse tromper par les individus’ (RTP, III, 533–34). So the concession to 
contingency is in its way decisive: such knowledge as may be derived from a scrutiny of any 
and all possible worlds remains wholly at risk from contingencies which are all too pressing. 
There seems, then, to be no way of minimizing the question of contingency and so of 
‘le chagrin’. In order to appraise this outcome, we need to return to the discourse of affect to 
which I referred at the outset. The discourse in question can certainly be said to be a feature 
of what Richard Bales terms the personal novel. Bales’s initial reference-point is the 
confessional novel of the early nineteenth century, whose essentially persuasive orientation 
extends, as he shows, into a range of later texts. There would be further scope to link this 
corpus to other contemporary works, including ones, like Elective Affinities, with a different 
narrative voice, or much later ones, like Anna Karenina, where the conflicts of personal life 
are represented within the vastly expanded framework characteristic of canonical realism. 
Here again, an adverse contingency is at issue: in the works analysed by Bales, chance, 
mishap, misadventure and malice all figure prominently and generate their own surplus of 
pain. Bales’s analysis also shows just how problematic the narrative telos can be under these 
conditions — not only subjectively, but also rhetorically (vis-à-vis the implied or actual 
addressee), and in turn socially. The representational yield of the personal novel considered 
generically is both distinctive and problematic: what Bales characterizes as ‘subjectivity with 
a vengeance’.8 This orientation is directly linked to its persuasive intent: the raison d’être of 
a personal narration directed at an audience at once stated and implicit is self-justification — 
its primary motivation being psychological, in that the act of telling proceeds on the basis of 
repeated appeals to human psychology. Built into the typically highly architectonic narrative 
frameworks which these texts mobilize is, then, the intimation of the wider significance of 
contingency as an issue which connects subjective crisis to a host of problems through which 
modernity defines itself: in the case of Adolphe, the salient problem is one which is central 
also to Constant’s political theory, namely freedom; in the case of Elective Affinities, it is that 
of social calm. Because in these earlier narratives and in Proust’s novel alike its impact 
                                            
8 Persuasion in the French Personal Novel, p. 4. 
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derives from the powerful sense it gives that everything is at stake, ‘le chagrin’, the states it 
provokes and the actions it prompts, are ways of dealing with contingency, both for the 
subject and in inter-subjective relations which prove to be pervasively governed by it. 
But the paradox of the persuasive intent is that, in narrative terms, it is 
characteristically rooted in the failure of the protagonists’ quests: hence, as Bales shows, the 
suspicion that attaches to it. The ‘chagrins’ which these personal narratives purport to 
document are embedded in a complex set of frameworks where evaluation is implicitly or 
explicitly at issue. So, the persuasive urge is played out against several distinct horizons: that 
of subjectivity, of course, in the first instance, in that the logic of persuasion presupposes a 
psychological and ethical framework just as it seeks to modify it; that of the social regulation 
of the kinds of action which precipitate or cause ‘le chagrin’;9 and symbolic, in that the 
contingencies of subjectivity come in turn to assume a special prominence within a 
framework that is essentially realist in orientation.10  
At the same time, there is, in the personal novel, an important element of virtuality in 
the representation of the passions as a system of causes and effects, something that surfaces 
at a pivotal moment in Goethe’s Elective Affinities: 
So all in their different fashions pursued their daily lives, thoughtfully or not; 
everything seemed to be following its usual course, as is the way in monstrously 
strange circumstances when everything is at stake: we go on with our lives as though 
nothing were the matter.11 
 
There is more than a hint here of what is unrepresentable. If we think of Proust’s Narrator, 
and his characterization of the recuperation of ‘le chagrin’ in ‘la connaissance spirituelle’, 
perhaps we might see it as a covert concession of the impenetrability of affectivity. The 
passions can make the improbable seem probable. They motivate the monstrous: this is in 
part what the progression of the story, stage by stage, will show. It is as if the workings of the 
passions operate as a parallel plot through which the monstrous can be apprehended. Daily 
life appears in the narrator’s comment almost as something to be taken for granted, but here 
too the issue is more complex. During the writing of Elective Affinities, Goethe mentions in a 
                                            
9 See Constant’s preface to the second edition of Adolphe, where he comments that certain 
choices expose us only to ‘le choix des maux’ (Adolphe, ed. by Daniel Leuwers (Paris: 
Garnier-Flammarion, 1989), p. 39). 
10 In the case of Adolphe, the wholly secular framework of the action can be said to align it 
with an emergent discourse of realism, by contrast with the belief systems invoked in 
Chateaubriand’s René. 
11 Elective Affinities: A Novel, trans. by David Constantine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), p. 89. 
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letter the sense of satisfaction to be derived from taking refuge from the political and military 
turbulence of the times in the depths of calm passions.12 The irony of this claim is very 
palpable: the calm passions of private life possess a turbulence of their own and Goethe 
himself acknowledged the ‘deep passionate wound’ which the fiction enveloped for him.13 If 
this is a tale of passion, what is at issue are its baleful effects. But the characters’ choices are 
also somehow implicated in a wider evaluative framework, even if only negatively, in the 
absence, for instance, of an effective compensatory frame, so that this story of the calmer 
passions ultimately jeopardizes the idea of social calm.  
 The contingency of subjectivity and the wider problems of evaluation which in turn it 
poses are issues of distinct import in Constant’s writing. In Constant’s politics as in his 
fiction, there is a relationship between choice and consciousness which is not always a benign 
one. Our choices about choices are the key to a dynamic process in which affectivity is an 
essential component.14 
If Adolphe’s feelings, like those of Goethe’s protagonists, are unfathomable, it is in 
part because of an unresolved tension between the demands of the world, in all their variety 
and their tenacity, and those of Ellénore. The story of the seduction of Ellénore and the affair 
is framed by his protracted and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to complete his social and 
his sentimental education and these focus increasingly on the desire for freedom. 
The ultimate subjective crisis comes about when Ellénore dies, where a lethal form of 
contingency is unleashed. Adolphe has resolved to leave her, but has not declared his 
intention. But it is revealed to her when she is sent Adolphe’s letter to another character in 
which he confirms this decision, at which point she becomes fatally ill. Death is experienced 
as an absolute separation; what he feels is not regret at lost love, but the shattering pain and 
horror of an irrevocable farewell, in the face of which the value of freedom is thrown into 
                                            
12 See ‘Die Wahlverwandtschaften’. Eine Dokumentation der Wirkung von Goethes Roman: 
1808–1832, ed. by Heinz Härtl (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1983), p. 43. 
13 Goethes Werke, X, Autobiographische Schriften II, ed. by Erich Trunz (Hamburg: Wegner, 
1959), p. 505; see also T. J. Reed, The Classical Centre: Goethe and Weimar, 1775–1832 
(London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 251, n. 18. 
14 This is the conclusion reached by Albert O. Hirschman in his phenomenological analysis of 
oscillations between the private and the public today, an analysis that explicitly takes 
Constant as its starting point; see Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 7–8; 96–99. But experiences like that of 
‘chagrin’ are not purely phenomenological; on this point, see André Green, who connects 
affect to unconscious process by virtue of its ‘produits de transformation’ (La Folie privée: 
psychanalyse des cas-limites (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), pp. 220–22). 
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doubt.15 What the power of his feelings serves to confirm is the reality of freedom of choice, 
even though it also shows that this reality has been imperfectly understood. The revaluation 
of freedom stems from the belatedness of Adolphe’s discovery of its reality. The absolute 
loss of Ellénore confirms the reality of a choice that cannot be recuperated. At the same time, 
the sense that death represents an absolute horizon confirms the significance of freedom as 
the source of human meaning. Further, this emergence of an equivocal relation to freedom is 
at the centre of the text’s means of representation, in that the narration of consciousness tends 
to play on a certain temporal indeterminacy precisely where the conflict between love and 
freedom is in play. What I have in mind here is that form of free indirect discourse which 
Sylvia Adamson has linked to the use of the ‘was-now’ construction, or the use of predicates 
in the imperfect combined with deictics which normally refer to the moment of speaking:  
Combien elle me pesait, cette liberté que j’avais tant regrettée! […] Naguère toutes 
mes actions avaient un but […] Personne maintenant ne les observait […] J’étais 
libre, en effet, je n’étais plus aimé.16 
 
Here, the occurrence of maintenant relates not, of course, to the moment of narration, which 
is in any case indeterminate, but to the state of consciousness that prevailed at the time of the 
events narrated; in other words, a number of distinct states of consciousness are merged.17 At 
the beginning of the chapter in question, at the point where Adolphe has resolved to break 
with Ellénore, love is valued because soon all that will remain is the memory of love. The 
perspective is reversed at the end of the chapter: the pain of lost love annihilates what was to 
                                            
15 Here I take issue with Tzvetan Todorov, who argues that in Adolphe affective 
independence does not map on to political autonomy (Benjamin Constant: la passion 
démocratique (Paris: Hachette, 1997), pp. 124–25). But given that, for Constant, the freedom 
of the moderns is freedom of choice, it follows that bad choices, whether privately or publicly 
directed, can generate a sense of loss that deprives freedom of its meaning. Cf. also Stephen 
Holmes who argues that the pessimism of Constant’s private works, including Adolphe, is 
sublimated in the political writings (Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern 
Liberalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 13–14). I query this dissocation of 
literary and philosophical perspectives on the basis that political dimensions of experience, as 
they impinge on subjectivity, could be said to amount to a distinctively continental version of 
modernity, in ‘Poetry and the Discourse of Happiness in Nineteenth-Century France: The 
Case of Vigny’, in Joie de vivre in French Literature and Culture: Essays in Honour of 
Michael Freeman, ed. by Susan Harrow and Timothy Unwin (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009), 
pp. 193–210. 
16 Adolphe, pp. 163–64. 
17 See Sylvia Adamson, who argues that in the Bildungsroman the ‘was’ form becomes a 
marker of fictionality and the ‘was-now’ combination a marker of ‘sympathetic imagination’ 
(‘The Rise and Fall of Empathetic Narrative: A Historical Perspective on Perspective’, in 
New Perspectives on Narrative Perspective, ed. by Willie van Peer and Seymour Chatman 
(New York: SUNY Press, 2001), pp. 83–99 (p. 95)). 
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have been the fulfilment of freedom. The full discovery of the significance of freedom, from 
the agent’s point of view, comes at a colossal cost: it is impossible to be free and happy. 
What the text relates is the suffering caused by the discovery of the co-existence of the desire 
for freedom with other desires and needs. 
The reality of freedom as choice makes for states of consciousness which are deeply 
equivocal. This problem is cast in a wider, no less troubling, perspective at the end of the 
text. The two framing letters at the end stage a debate about the moral and social significance 
of the anecdote: the publisher castigates Adolphe for his lack of principles, his correspondent 
argues from the inescapable force of social values and pressures. It remains altogether 
unclear whether these letters can be said to be compensatory or ironic. The letters could be 
taken to be compensatory in the sense that they rectify any residual dependence we may have 
on Adolphe’s telling of the story. But they are ironic — they are many-voiced — in that the 
first letter pre-empts the second and is in turn pre-empted by Adolphe’s own telling of the 
story. There is no last word. Each judgement projects us back into the story. The conflict of 
values which the text exposes is inescapable and the reality of freedom, in all its 
ambivalence, is sustained until the end. 
For Bales, there is a sharp division between this mode of writing and that of Proust. 
The personal novel is, as we have seen, rooted in failures which the process of narration is 
intended, in some way, to redeem. The characteristic failure of the narrator’s quest becomes 
the condition of a psychologically centred self-exploration in which the reader is implicated, 
though in conflictual ways. Again, the comparison with Proust is potentially telling, in that 
one way in which the juxtaposition of ‘le chagrin’ and ‘la connaissance spirituelle’ can itself 
be seen is as a compensatory move, though in the case of the Recherche directed at the 
subject who finds himself freshly confronted with painful contingencies. In the case of 
Proust, for Bales, the subjective outcome of a vastly extended quest, subject to the most 
extraordinary vicissitudes, is ultimately determined by a kind of complicity which the text 
sustains with the reader.18 The turn which these issues take in the Recherche is, if we follow 
Bales, distinctive. Contingency contributes to defining a dominant element of the book on 
which the Narrator is, finally, about to embark — the redemptive telos and perhaps also its 
potential as a source of creativity — but it also carries with it the very high likelihood that 
this project opens precariously onto a future in which it will come to be reoriented, redefined, 
                                            
18 For comments on the sense of complicity which results from the reader’s access to the 
creative act in its full immediacy, see Proust: ‘A la recherche du temps perdu’, p. 82. 
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deflected, and further that negative contingencies (paralysis, death) may in the end have the 
upper hand. 
What all of these relationships, discursive and social, as well as textual, reveal is this: 
contingency is an issue with two notable interpretative dimensions. On the one hand, 
exposure to contingency confronts us with the sense that meanings which matter lie in the 
future. On the other hand, the extent to which the evaluation of contingency can be social as 
well as subjective connects it to the ways in which categories like that of modernity are 
constituted as explanatory frameworks. To close, I shall argue that central to the treatment of 
the former, in the Recherche, is a model of representation which the Narrator’s theorization 
of ‘le chagrin’ and its transmutation into ‘la connaissance spirituelle’ tends to occlude. I shall 
also argue that a central aspect of Proust’s great aesthetic gamble is the means by which he 
broaches the problems which this latter dimension poses, namely the sense that what we term 
modernity is a space of interpretations, sometimes enabling, sometimes conflictual, of 
contingencies whose impact is pervasive. 
First, representation. The recovery of the past finally vindicates the Narrator’s project, 
but leaves it exposed to a duality without apparent resolution. What’s at issue is the 
Narrator’s relation to the materials of the projected work. On the one hand, it is with ‘la vraie 
vie’ that art is equated (RTP, IV, 459). On the other hand, the ‘chagrins’ of life are something 
which, for the sake of the art work, we must somehow overcome. ‘La connaissance 
spirituelle’, because it imposes the impossible perspective of one who is beyond death, who 
exists only in his works, discounts loss. In this way, it is a bulwark against contingency. But 
it is self-impoverishing: if the subjective perspective is disallowed, then any and all 
contingencies, happy or not, are marginalized. Only death delivers us from contingency and 
the threat of death exacerbates the anxieties which it occasions. The redemptive outcome 
amounts to a space of painful contradictions and there is some intimation also that ‘la 
connaissance spirituelle’ lies in a future from which the subject is ultimately divorced. 
What’s required to bring these two perspectives, if not into alignment, then at least into 
contact, is a theory of representation, one in which we can point to how contingency and its 
affective impacts can in some way be engaged with. 
What I referred to at the outset as a discourse of affectivity has its own bearing on 
these issues, in that it may provide the means by which feeling can be understood in itself and 
also as the essential medium of the self-world relation. In his essay on Elective Affinities, 
Walter Benjamin brilliantly encapsulates this feature of nineteenth-century fiction: ‘The 
lament full of tears: that is emotion. […] The more deeply emotion understands itself, the 
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more it is transition; for the true poet, it never signifies an end’.19 In part, no doubt, what 
Benjamin refers to can be viewed conventionally as the mutability of feeling; but here he also 
hints at the problem which is intrinsically that of representation, which is its inaccessibility.20 
For the relationship between affect and representation is not stable, so much so that what we 
may say about feeling does indeed have almost a fictional component. It is for this reason that 
Nietzsche characterizes as universal the difference between having an experience, on the one 
hand, and describing it, on the other: 
Achilles and Homer. — It is always as between Achilles and Homer: the one has the 
experience, the sensation, the other describes it. A true writer bestows words on the 
emotions and experiences of others, he is an artist so as to divine much from the little 
he himself has felt.21 
 
In other words, representation is understood with reference to a contingency of bestowing, as 
Nietzsche puts it, which is nonetheless productive.  
It is on the point where representation and contingency converge in Proust that it is 
possible to draw some conclusions regarding the wider scope of the latter. Roland Barthes, 
like Bales, highlights the identificatory movement which so marks the Recherche, insisting 
that what matters is not the canonical monumentality of the work and its author, but rather the 
scope to identify with ‘l’ouvrier, tantôt tourmenté, tantôt exalté […] qui a voulu entreprendre 
une tâche à laquelle […] il a conféré un caractère absolu’.22 This desire for the absolute is the 
decisive shift in focus which characterizes the closing part of Le Temps retrouvé. Yet at the 
same time the novel’s aesthetic dimension consists in a search along the lines envisaged by 
Nietzsche; it can be said, not to perpetuate, but rather to elicit, as we have just seen, affect 
and in turn to reactualize the subjective processes which are its ‘contenants’, not its 
‘contenus’: the ‘contenants’ of representation originate in processes of affect which are 
themselves ‘contenants’.23 Art is a space of rediscovery, a reappropriation of materials from 
which, because of death, the subject will ultimately be divorced. Contingency is the 
                                            
19 ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities’, in Selected Writings, I, 1913–1926, ed. by Marcus Bullock 
and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 297–360 
(p. 349). 
20 See Adam Phillips, who comments that, while representation can make instinct ‘tolerable’, 
‘there is an intensity of affect which representation cannot bind’ (Promises, Promises: Essays 
on Literature and Psychoanalysis (London: Faber, 2000), pp. 305–06). 
21 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. by R. J. 
Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 97.  
22 ‘“Longtemps, je me suis couché de bonne heure”’, in Œuvres complètes, V, 1977–1980, ed. 
by Éric Marty (Paris: Seuil, 2002), pp. 459–70 (p. 459). 
23 Green, La Folie privée, pp. 68–70.  
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counterpart of that search which expresses itself as the recovery of lost time: it represents all 
of its deflections and reversals, and the pleasure and pain they may cause. It signifies that a 
search can continue beyond the apparent point of resolution, where it transmutes into 
something altogether limitless. The aesthetic matters because it represents this limitless 
search, at least as far as it can be connected with affectivity. It can also be seen as a gesture 
towards as a space of possibilities that remains open, a pure reaffirmation, seemingly 
unaffected by the madness from which it may stem, of the future as the space of human and 
aesthetic projects that matter. Its futureness matters more perhaps than anything else. This is 
the sense of the work’s aesthetic gamble: it consists in assuming the contingencies of the 
redemptive outcome and seeing to what extent and how the artwork can become the bearer of 
‘a future trajectory’.24 The novel’s extravagant commitment to and realization of the aesthetic 
is a magnificent façade. It connects with but also conceals all of the novel’s inner 
articulations. It contains, but, of course, is different from, the whole host of problems which 
beset the narrative, those of representation, affect, madness, loss and more. Because distinct 
from affect, it allows us somehow to become open to its contingencies; because it is 
connected to affect, we can engage with our passions, irrespective of phenomenology, 
independently of social factors which have a bearing on evaluation. The novel’s impact, 
which is aesthetic more than it is spiritual, brings us to a point where it is possible to believe, 
because in being confronted with it in new and unexpected ways we somehow go beyond it, 
that we are perhaps not absolutely ruled by contingency.25 
 
                                            
24 It is on this basis that Luciano Berio advocates a concern for artistic behaviour that ‘revises 
or suspends our relation with the past’ (Remembering the Future (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), p. 2). 
25 On the recognition of contingency as a way of mastering it, see Richard Rorty, 
Contingency, Solidarity, and Irony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 103. 
